

Notice—Continuation of Iraqi Emergency

July 28, 1998

On August 2, 1990, by Executive Order 12722, President Bush declared a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Government of Iraq. By Executive Orders 12722 of August 2, 1990, and 12724 of August 9, 1990, the President imposed trade sanctions on Iraq and blocked Iraqi government assets. Because the Government of Iraq has continued its activities hostile to United States interests in the Middle East, the national emergency declared on August 2, 1990, and the measures adopted on August 2 and August 9, 1990, to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond August 2, 1998. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect to Iraq.

This notice shall be published in the *Federal Register* and transmitted to the Congress.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
July 28, 1998.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 8:45 a.m., July 30, 1998]

NOTE: This notice was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on July 29, and it was published in the *Federal Register* on July 31.

Message to the Congress Transmitting the Notice on the Continuation of Iraqi Emergency

July 28, 1998

To the Congress of the United States:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the *Federal Register* and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency

is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the Iraqi emergency is to continue in effect beyond August 2, 1998, to the *Federal Register* for publication.

The crisis between the United States and Iraq that led to the declaration on August 2, 1990, of a national emergency has not been resolved. The Government of Iraq continues to engage in activities inimical to stability in the Middle East and hostile to United States interests in the region. Such Iraqi actions pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and vital foreign policy interests of the United States. For these reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities necessary to apply economic pressure on the Government of Iraq.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
July 28, 1998.

NOTE: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on July 29.

Message to the Congress Reporting on Bosnia-Herzegovina

July 28, 1998

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105–174, I am providing this report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to meet the goals set forth therein.

With my certification to the Congress of March 3, 1998, I outlined ten conditions—or benchmarks—under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. Section 7 of Public Law 105–174 urges that we seek concurrence among NATO allies on: (1) the benchmarks set forth with the March 3 certification; (2) estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks; and (3) a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving those benchmarks. NATO has agreed to move ahead in all these areas.

First, NATO agreed to benchmarks parallel to ours on May 28 as part of its approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military

plan (OPLAN 10407). Furthermore, the OPLAN requires SFOR to develop detailed criteria for each of these benchmarks, to be approved by the North Atlantic Council, which will provide a more specific basis to evaluate progress. SFOR will develop the benchmark criteria in coordination with appropriate international civilian agencies.

Second, with regard to timelines, the United States proposed that NATO military authorities provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for implementation of the military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the benchmark criteria. Allies agreed to this approach on June 10. As SACEUR General Wesley Clark testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee June 4, the development and approval of the criteria and estimated target dates should take 2 to 3 months.

Third, with regard to a review process, NATO will continue the 6-month review process that began with the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, incorporating the benchmarks and detailed criteria. The reviews will include an assessment of the security situation, an assessment of compliance by the parties with the Dayton Agreement, an assessment of progress against the benchmark criteria being developed by SFOR, recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian agencies, and recommendations on any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force.

While not required under Public Law 105-174, we have sought to further utilize this framework of benchmarks and criteria for Dayton implementation among civilian implementation agencies. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) adopted the same framework in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9, 1998. The declaration, which serves as the civilian implementation agenda for the next 6 months, now includes language that corresponds to the benchmarks in the March 3 certification to the Congress and in the SFOR OPLAN. In addition, the PIC Steering Board called on the High Representative to submit a report on the progress made in meeting these goals by mid-September, which will be considered in the NATO 6-month review process.

The benchmark framework, now approved by military and civilian implementers, is clearly a better approach than setting a fixed, arbitrary end date to the mission. This process will produce a clear picture of where intensive efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina for which a major international military force will no longer be necessary. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines can prove impossible to meet and tend to encourage those who would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Realistic target dates, combined with concerted use of incentives, leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an enduring peace. While the benchmark process will be useful as a tool both to promote and review the pace of Dayton implementation, the estimated target dates established will be notional, and their attainment dependent upon a complex set of interdependent factors.

We will provide a supplemental report once NATO has agreed upon detailed criteria and estimated target dates. The continuing 6-month reviews of the status of implementation will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with Congress. These reviews, and any updates to the estimated timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent reports submitted pursuant to Public Law 105-174. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
July 28, 1998.

NOTE: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on July 29.

**Message to the Congress
Transmitting the District of
Columbia Budget Request
July 28, 1998**

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with section 202(c) of the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility